

Botnet research, Mitigation and the Law

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Disclaimer

- I am an attorney, just not your attorney
- This talk is for edutainment purposes only
- This field of law is in flux- what is correct today may not be so next year
- Local laws vary
- Contents may settle during shipping
- Special thanks to Jose Nazario and the Shmoocon organizers

Why this talk is relevant

- Laws designed to protect users & systems are broad and vague
 - Lots of discretion in the prosecution's hands
 - 'Myth of the Super-User' is alive and well
- Researchers & IT security are easily reached
 - compared to computer criminals
 - to a jury, 'freelance security researcher' and 'evil computer hacker' may look alike
- FUD alert
 - Lots of this is hypothetical- be wary, not alarmed

Wiretap Act

- 18 USC 2511 (Wiretap Act)
 - Regulates the use of wiretaps, sniffers and full content network monitoring and divulging the contents
 - Broad prohibition against 'interception'
 - Contemporaneous (with transmission)
 - Acquisition (of)
 - The *contents* of an electronic transmission
 - Also criminalizes the *distribution* of illegally obtained communications

Wiretap Act, Continued

- Exceptions to prohibition on capture
 - Valid wiretap warrant/FISA order
 - Prior permission of 'party to communication'
 - To identify a source of electronic interference; or
 - 'Provider' of electronic communications service and
 - necessary to render service or
 - protection of rights/property of the provider
 - Fraud *against* instead of *using* the phone company
- Exceptions to prohibition on distribution
 - No knowledge that content was obtained illegally

Trap & Trace

- 18 USC 3121
 - Captures to/from/when with phone calls
 - Has been extended to email & packets
 - Routing information
 - More permissive than wiretaps
 - Provider exception
 - To protect users/provider/connected networks from fraud
 - Testing/maintenance
 - Billing
 - Or with warrant/court order/subpoena

Stored Communications Act

- 18 USC 2701- Stored Communications Act
 - Protects electronic communications while in transitory or long-term storage
 - Very transitory
 - Exceptions:
 - Intended recipient or sender (or with their consent)
 - Provider of 'electronic communications service'
 - No restrictions on their use- kinda
 - Valid court order/warrant

Computer Fraud And Abuse Act

- 18 USC 1030- Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
 - Protects most Internet- connected computers from intentional unauthorized access or exceeding granted access
 - Requires fraudulent intent or damage

More Fed laws

- 18 USC 1029
 - Prohibits counterfeiting or unauthorized use of 'access devices'
 - 'Access Device' is mechanical, electronic or logical object to gain access
- 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
 - prohibits unreasonable searches or seizures by State actors
- DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act)
 - Prohibits breaking of 'access controls' on copyrighted material

More relevant law

- State laws on the above topics
 - Often mirror Federal laws
 - Some interesting wrinkles (wiretap law as example)
- Common law torts
 - Nuisance
 - Slander/Libel
 - Intrusion into seclusion

Botnet Research Methods

- Capture
 - Active (go out and get malware)
 - Actual (use vulnerable browser/application)
 - Simulated (use tool that mimics vulnerable app)
 - FTP (go to malware repository)
 - Passive (let it come to you)
 - Honeypot/net
 - Collection from infected end-users

Active capture- legal issues

- Misconfigured acquisition tool/application causing damage to innocents
 - 1030 violation
 - Nuisance tort
- Downloading from malware repository
 - If in violation of site terms of service, 1030/contract claims

Passive Capture- legal issues

- Honeypot/net
 - Possible nuisance if net is staging ground
- End-user collection
 - Without permission-
 - 1030 unlawful access
 - 2511 if live capture of packets obtained
 - 2701 if stored communications obtained

Testing of malware- issues

- Reverse engineering/static analysis
 - Is the malware protected by copyright/DMCA?
- Sandbox/dynamic analysis
 - Potential nuisance if sandbox insecurely connected to outside world


Publication legal issues

- Libel/slander claims
 - Negative, untrue statement of product
- Trade secret
 - If vendor has disclosed 'controlled' secrets
- 2511 'divulgement'
 - illegal interception and content is revealed

Monitoring of herders

- Logging onto herder IRC server to get info
 - Passive monitoring
 - Either listening between infected machine and herder or spoofing infected PC
 - Active monitoring
 - Poking around in the IRC server
- Sniffing traffic between bot & control channel
- What if herder is using 'mixed' server?
 - innocent and illicit traffic together

Insert crappy schematic



Issues of standing

- Unlikely that actual criminals will raise the issue
 - either civilly or criminally
- But you're not off the hook yet
 - Innocent traffic & users may complain
 - and sue
- Legal and illegal sites may not identify themselves

Researcher Hypo

- University researcher implements honeynet
 - Assumes all incoming traffic is illicit
 - And thus capture/storage/publication OK
 - Gets misrouted innocent traffic
 - Due to own error
 - Due to sender's error
 - Due to third party error
 - Makes traffic content available
 - Is in 2-party consent state

Is our researcher in trouble?

- Inadvertent acquisition is not wiretapping
 - But it's an affirmative defense only
 - If it's not, they're in trouble
 - Can't raise the 'provider' defense, as honeypot not related to protecting their network
 - Disclosure not related to protecting their own network
 - What about consent?
 - Receiver granted consent, so Feds are ok
 - State can get interested
 - As example- PA law- *all* parties must agree or
 - Prior agreement
 - in writing
 - Verified by Attorney General's office or DA's office

Botnet Defense

- Passive monitoring/defenses
 - IDS on own network
 - Or client's network
 - with permission and within scope
- Server side monitoring
 - When you discover a control server
 - Live or static investigation

Botnet Defense, contuned

- Takedown/Disruption
 - Pull the plug/null route/
 - Ok, if...
 - it's yours
 - you have permission
 - Actual permission
 - 'constructive' permission
 - DNS poisoning
 - Contract between herder & DNS provider
 - More 'macho' responses
 - Counter-attack
 - Self-defense may be no defense at all...

IT defender Hypothetical

- End-user IT defenders
 - Get unfriendly traffic from botnet
 - Actively monitor incoming traffic
 - Gets upstream provider to dump traffic
- ISP defenders
 - Most traffic to and from their own clients
 - One or more clients being attacked
 - Actively monitor incoming/outgoing traffic
 - Dumps traffic, disconnects infected hosts

Hypo outcome

- End user defender-
 - Has permission to monitor own traffic
 - Employee contracts
 - Dumping traffic OK
 - Provided that it is either
 - True
 - good-faith based on evidence
- ISP defender
 - May have permission to monitor own traffic
 - TOS
 - Or can use 'prevent fraud' clause
 - Dumping traffic
 - Contract issue between users and ISP

Take-aways

- To protect yourself-
 - Write monitoring clauses in contracts with clients
 - Seek to avoid monitoring innocent traffic
 - Routing metadata less protected than content of communications
 - Stored communications protected differently
- Counterattacks are stupid
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